Stochastic gain in population dynamics by Traulsen, Arne et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
40
26
47
v2
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  7
 M
ay
 20
04
Stochastic gain in population dynamics
Arne Traulsen∗, Torsten Ro¨hl, and Heinz Georg Schuster
Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik und Astrophysik, Christian-Albrechts Universita¨t, Olshausenstraße 40, 24098 Kiel, Germany
(Dated: May 7th, 2004)
We introduce an extension of the usual replicator dynamics to adaptive learning rates. We show that a popu-
lation with a dynamic learning rate can gain an increased average payoff in transient phases and can also exploit
external noise, leading the system away from the Nash equilibrium, in a reasonance-like fashion. The payoff
versus noise curve resembles the signal to noise ratio curve in stochastic resonance. Seen in this broad context,
we introduce another mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to improve properties of the system. Such a
mechanism could be of particular interest in economic systems.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 02.50.Le, 05.40.-a, 05.45.-a
Game theory [1] describes situations in which the success
or payoff of an individual depends on its own action as well
as on the actions of others. This paradigm can be applied
to biological systems, as evolution through natural selection
can be viewed as an optimization process in which the fitness-
landscape changes with the state of the adaptive populations
[2]. Evolutionary game theory focuses mainly on systems
with a single fitness function for all individuals, which is iden-
tified with the payoff function of a game [3, 4, 5]. In nature
often different populations with different ambitions interact
with each other, as shoppers and sellers [6], attackers and de-
fenders [6], or males and females [5]. Here, the payoff func-
tions are different for the interacting populations. A mean-
field description of such asymmetric conflicts is given by the
coupled replicator equations [4, 5, 7]. These equations have a
very rich dynamical behavior and can even display Hamilto-
nian chaos [8, 9]. In previous work [3, 4, 5] it has been tac-
itly assumed that both populations have the same adaptation
mechanisms. But it seems to be natural that different mecha-
nisms are applied by the interacting populations, e.g. different
adaptation rates. Here, we analyze such systems for the case
that both populations have slightly different adaptation mech-
anisms. We assume that one population can control its own
adaptation rate. This alters the velocity when the system is
approaching the stable Nash equilibria [10] in strategy space,
leading to an increased average payoff.
In real systems fluctuations disturbing the system are to be
expected. Such disturbances can arise from a variety of ef-
fects, e.g. errors of the players [11], deviations from a per-
fectly mixed population, or immigration of individuals with
different strategy distributions. So far, stochastic extensions
to the replicator dynamics have mainly been analyzed in the
context of equilibrium selection [12, 13]. Here, we show that a
population with adaptive learning rate can obtain an increased
payoff if these fluctuations are present. For small noise inten-
sities the average payoff increases, while very large fluctua-
tions cannot longer be exploited, leading to a decrease of the
average payoff. This recalls the stochastic resonance effect
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[14, 15, 16, 17], where the signal to noise ratio of a system
is improved for intermediate noise intensities. In contrast to
the usual stochastic resonance, a periodic force is not involved
here, making the mechanism more similar to coherence reso-
nance [18]. Seen in this broader context, we introduce another
mechanism that exploits fluctuations in order to improve the
performance of the system.
We consider two adaptive species X and Y —each with dif-
ferent strategies—that are involved in a repeated game. Both
populations have different objectives described by payoff ma-
trices Px and Py . The fraction of individuals xi that adopt a
certain strategy i grows proportional to the relative payoff of
the strategy i, the same holds for Y . In the presence of noise
this coevolution can be described by the coupled replicator
equations,
x˙i = xiηx [Π
x
i − 〈Πx〉] + ξxi (1)
y˙i = yiηy [Π
y
i − 〈Πy〉] + ξyi ,
where ηx and ηy are the learning rates of the populations. We
assume for simplicity that the noise ξi is Gaussian with auto-
correlation 〈ξki (t)ξlj(s)〉 = σ2δijδklδ(t − s) as in [12]. We
also follow [12] choosing reflecting boundaries. The payoffs
are defined as Πxi = (Px · y)i, 〈Πx〉 = xT · Px · y, and simi-
larly for y.
We extend the usual replicator dynamics by introducing
adaptive learning rates as
ηx = 1− tanh (αx∆Π) , (2)
where ∆Π = 〈Πx〉 − 〈Πy〉 is the time dependent difference
between the average payoffs of the populations and αx ≥ 0 is
a “perception ability” of the population. In order to maintain
the basic features of the replicator dynamics, the learning rate
must be a positive function with 〈η〉 = 1, which is ensured
by Eq. (2). For αx > 0 the population X learns slower if
it is currently in a good position, otherwise it learns faster.
The value of αx determines how well a population can assess
its current state. The adaptive learning rate leads to a faster
escape from unfavourable states, while on the other hand the
population tends to remain in preferable states. Other choices
for ηx which ensure these properties mentioned above will not
alter our results. In the following we will focus on a setting
where only one population has an adaptive learning rate ηx as
in Eq. (2).
The noise introduced above drives the system away from
the Nash equilibrium and leads for small amplitude to a posi-
tive gain of the population with adaptive learning rate whereas
for large noise amplitudes the fluctuations smear out the tra-
jectories in phase space so strongly that they can no longer be
exploited. Hence, we expect an optimal noise effect for inter-
mediate values of σ. In order to be able to compare the payoffs
of both populations we assume that the dynamics starts from
the Nash equilibrium.
As a first example, we consider the zero sum game “match-
ing pennies” [3, 19]. Here, both players can choose between
two options ±1. Player one wins if both players select the
same option and player two wins otherwise. The game is de-
scribed by the payoff matrices
Px =
(
+1 −1
−1 +1
)
= −Py. (3)
The replicator equations follow from Eqs. (1) and (3) as
x˙ = −2ηxx(2y − 1)(x− 1) + ξx
y˙ = +2ηyy(2x− 1)(y − 1) + ξy , (4)
where x = x0 and y = y0. Let us first consider the zero noise
limit in the case ηx = ηy = 1. As for all zero-sum games, i.e.
Px = −PTy , the system (1) without noise becomes Hamilto-
nian and has a constant of motion [20]. Here, the constant is
given by H(x, y) = −2 ln [x(1− x)] − 2 ln [y(1− y)]. The
trajectories oscillate around the Nash equilibrium at x = y =
1/2. H(x, y) is connected to the temporal integral of the av-
erage payoff 〈Πx〉 = (xt)T · Px · yt during a period with
〈Πx〉 > 0,
∫ t1
t0
〈Πx〉dt = −H
(
x0,
1
2
)−H ( 12 , 12)
4
, (5)
where (x, y) = (x0, 12 ) at t0 and (x, y) = (
1
2 , x0) at t1.
If we include adaptive learning rates (2) into the system,
we find H˙(x, y) = −2 tanh(αx∆Π)∆Π ≤ 0, vanishing for
αx = 0. Hence, adaptive learning rates dampen the oscil-
lations around the Nash equilibrium and the trajectories in
the x − y plane spiral towards the Nash equilibrium where
〈Πx〉 = 〈Πy〉 = 0, see Fig. 1. In addition, this leads to an in-
creased payoff of one population. As the matrices (3) describe
a zero sum game it is sufficient for a population if it knows its
own current average payoff 〈∆Π〉 = 2〈Πx〉.
Numerical simulations for αx > 0 show that the temporal
integral of the payoff becomes
〈
∫ t1
t0
〈Πx〉dt〉(x0,y0) = −
1
8
(H(x1, y1)−H(x0, y0)) . (6)
The averaged initial value H(x0, y0) can be calculated as∫∫ 1
0
dx0dy0H(x0, y0) = 8. For t → ∞ the system re-
laxes to the Nash equilibrium where H = 8 ln 2. Hence, we
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FIG. 1: Matching pennies: Comparison between the behavior of a
population with constant learning rate, i.e. αx = 0, (thin lines) and a
population with adaptive learning rate (perception ability αx = 10,
thick lines). The opponent has in both cases a constant learning rate
ηy = 1. Left: Trajectories in strategy space. Arrows show the vector
field of the replicator dynamics. Population X has positive (negative)
average payoff in gray (white) areas. Right: Time development of
the average payoff of the population X . The adaptive learning rate
increases the time intervals in which the corresponding population
has a positive payoff, dampening the oscillations around the Nash
equilibrium [22].
find for the average cumulated payoff 〈∫∞t0 〈Πx〉dt〉(x0,y0) ≤
− 18 (8 ln 2− 8) ≈ 0.307. Numerical simulations yield
0.308 ± 0.005 independent of α. We conclude that a pop-
ulation can increase its average payoff if it has an adaptive
learning rate αx > 0 and if the game does not start in the Nash
equilibrium. The adaptation parameter α influences only the
time scale on which the Nash equilibrium is approached.
Small noise intensities drive the system away from the
fixed point and the population with the adaptive learning rate
gains an increased payoff. If the noise amplitude σ becomes
too large the trajectories will be smeared out homogeneously
over the positive (gray) and negative (white) payoff regions
in phase space (Fig. 1). This implies that the average gain
of population one decreases to zero. Although the average
payoff is very small even for the optimal noise intensity, the
cumulated payoff increases linearly in time. This means that
for long times the gained payoff accumulates to a profitable
value.
As a second application we analyze the effect of adaptive
learning rates and noise on the prisoner’s dilemma. We use
the standard payoff matrix [21],
Px =
(
3 0
5 1
)
= Py, (7)
where rows and columns are placed in the order “cooperate”,
“defect”. As this game is not a zero sum game, the population
with the adaptive learning rate must be able to compare its
own average payoff with the opponent’s average payoff. The
replicator dynamics of this system is determined by Eqs. (1)
and (7),
x˙ = xηx(x − 1)(1 + y) + ξx (8)
y˙ = yηy(y − 1)(1 + x) + ξy .
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FIG. 2: Matching pennies: Average payoff of a population with adap-
tive learning rate against a population with constant learning rate un-
der the influence of noise for different noise intensities (αy = 0,
averages over 2× 104 initial conditions and 2× 104 time steps, see
[22] for further details).
There is a stable fixed point in the Nash equilibrium x = y =
0 where both players defect and an unstable fixed point for
mutual cooperation, i.e., x = y = 1.
The average payoff difference under the influence of noise
is similar as in matching pennies. Small fluctuations lead the
system slowly away from the Nash equilibrium and tend to
increase the payoff. If the fluctuations are too large they dis-
turb population with adaptive learning rates and the payoff de-
creases again, see Fig. 3. Interestingly enough, here too much
noise even leads to a decreasing payoff difference.
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FIG. 3: Prisoner’s dilemma: Average payoff difference of a popu-
lation with adaptive learning rate against a population with constant
learning rate for different noise intensities. The negative payoffs arise
from the fact that we have ηx < ηy for x < y (∆t = 0.01, αy = 0,
averages over 2× 104 initial conditions and 2× 104 time steps).
In order to describe the “stochastic gain” effect analyti-
cally we introduce a simplified model. A linearization of
Eq. (8) around the stable Nash equilibrium leads for con-
stant learning rates to x˙ = −ηxx + ξx and y˙ = −ηyy + ξy .
We now analyze a game in which the replicator dynamics is
given by these linear equations and include adaptive learning
rates based on the payoffs for the prisoner’s dilemma. With
∆Π = −5(x − y) the adaptive learning rate ηx becomes
ηx = 1+ tanh(5α(x− y)) ≈ 1+ 5α(x− y) for α, x, y ≪ 1.
The simplified system can be viewed as a small noise ex-
pansion of the prisoner’s dilemma, where the trajectory stays
close to the Nash equilibrium. For ηy = 1 the simplified noisy
replicator equations read
x˙ = −x− α′x(x− y) + ξx (9a)
y˙ = −y + ξy , (9b)
where α′ = 5α. The effect of different constant learning rates
is discussed in [23]. The mechanism we introduce here is
more intricated, as the adaptive learning rate leads to a dy-
namical adjustment of the learning rate and the average of
ηx = 1 + α
′(x− y) over all possible strategies is ηy = 1.
Equation (9b) describes an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
[24], here the dynamics is restricted to 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. The
Fokker-Planck equation [25] for py = py(y, t|y0, t0),
p˙y =
d
dy
(
ypy +
σ2
2
d
dy
py
)
, (10)
has the stationary solution psy = Nye−y
2/σ2
, where N−1y =∫ 1
0 e
−y2/σ2dy. We find the mean value 〈y(σ)〉 as
〈y〉 =
∫ 1
0
dypyy =
σ
(
1− e−σ−2
)
√
piErf( 1σ )
. (11)
y is a correlated stochastic process which appears in Eq. (9a)
as a multiplicative noise. Numerical simulations indicate that
we may neglect the stochastic nature of y and replace it by
〈y〉 for small α. This leads to an approximated Fokker-Planck
equation for px = px(x, t|x0, 0)
p˙x =
d
dx
[
−a(x)px + σ
2
2
d
dx
px
]
(12)
where a(x) = −x− xα′(x− 〈y〉). Since x is (similarly to y)
also restricted to 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 we find the stationary solution
psx = Nx exp
[
−x
2
σ2
− 2α
′x3
3σ2
+
α′〈y〉x2
σ2
]
(13)
with the normalization constant Nx. Since x is typically of
the order of σ for σ ≪ 1 the term x2/σ2 is finite. Therefore
we can expand Eq. (13) for α′ ≪ 1 and obtain expanding 〈x〉
again an analytical expression for 〈∆Π〉 = −5(〈x〉 − 〈y〉)
〈∆Π〉 = −5α′ d
dα′
〈x〉 = 5α′
[
σ2
2
− δ3σγ(1 − γ)2 (14)
+ δ2(1 − γ)
(
5
3
γ − 7
6
σ2(1− γ)
)
− δγ
(
2
3σ
+ σ
)]
,
where δ = 1√
piErf(1/σ)
and γ = e−1/σ2 . The asymptotics of
Eq. (14) can be computed as 〈∆Π〉 = α′/ (24σ2) for σ ≫ 1
and 〈∆Π〉 = α′ ( 52 − 356pi )σ2 for σ ≪ 1. We stress that this
simplified system which consists of a stable fixed point with
linear adaptive learning rate in the presence of noise is the
3
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FIG. 4: Simplified model: Comparison of the average payoff differ-
ence 〈∆Π〉 from a simulation of Eqs. (9a,9b) and the analytical func-
tion Eq. (14) (∆t = 0.01, α′ = 5α = 0.1, averages over 4 × 104
time steps and 4× 104 realizations).
simplest possible model that describes the stochastic gain ef-
fect. Fig. 4 shows a comparison between the analytical payoff
difference Eq. (14) and a simulation of Eqs. (9a,9b).
To summarize, we have introduced an extension to the usual
replicator dynamics that modifies the the learning rates using
a simple “win stay—lose shift” rule. In this way, a popu-
lation optimizes the payoff difference to a competing popu-
lation. This simple rule leads to a convergence towards the
mixed Nash equilibrium for the game of “matching pennies”
[26]. Even in games with stable Nash equilibria as the “pris-
oner’s dilemma” transient phases can be exploited, although
the basins of attraction are not altered, as e.g. in [23]. Weak
external noise drives the system into the transient regime and
leads to an increased gain for one adaptive population.
In conclusion, we have found a learning process which
improves the gain of the population with adaptive learning
rate under the influence of external noise. Fluctuations lead
to an increased payoff for intermediate noise intensities in a
resonance-like fashion. This phenomenon could be of par-
ticular interest in economics, where interactions are always
subject to external disturbances [6, 13, 27].
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